Introduction
In May 2003, during his annual address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Russian President Vladimir Putin put forth his strategic position regarding Russia's choice to integrate with Europe: '... this is our historical choice. It has been made'. Recognizing the complexities and long-term nature of the goal, Putin referred to shared interests: 'It is also obvious that our interests, and the interests of "Greater Europe" require that serious steps be made towards each other'. 1 This declaration was followed in his 2005 address to the Federal Assembly by an affirmation of Russia's commitment to European values, referring to 'the ideals of freedom, human rights, justice and democracy' as 'our society's determining values'.
2 In his 2006 speech, after giving priority mention to the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Putin identified the European Union (EU) as 'our biggest partner', promising the potential for 'mutually beneficial economic ties '. 3 Putin's declarations appeal both to common values and to shared interests as the basis for Russia's 'European choice'. Yet in fact, the relative importance of these two foundations represents an underlying tension in the relationship between the EU and Russia. The EU's self-perception emphasizes the primacy of values, and the EU in many instances takes the position of a normative actor in relations with its neighbours. As stated by the European Parliament and Council in October 2006 in the regulations governing the Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (NPI), 'the privileged relationship between the European Union and its neighbours should build on commitments to common values, including democracy, the rule of law, good governance and respect for human rights, and to the principles of market economy, open rule-based and fair trade, sustainable development, and poverty reduction'. 4 However, even as Putin proclaims support for European values, the Russian approach is grounded more clearly in the notion of interests, rooted in a defence of Russian state sovereignty. Even when Putin does speak about values, he places it in the context of national interest. In referring to Russia's 'civilizing mission' in Eurasia, he defines the mission as 'ensuring that democratic values, combined with national interests, enrich and strengthen our historic community'.
5
In asserting both common values and shared interests with Europe, Putin may, however, be opening a Pandora's Box. While the assertion of Russian national interests is a basis of Putin's domestic popularity, his proclaimed support for European political values (democracy, rule of law and human rights) could feed popular doubts about Russian domestic policies and recent institutional changes in relation to these very values. European leaders and institutions have issued repeated public criticisms of Russia's record in relation to democracy and human rights; furthermore, neighbouring Ukraine's Orange Revolution provided a potential model in linking national interest, a 'European choice' and a challenge to undemocratic practices. Based on public opinion surveys carried out in Russia, this chapter explores popular attitudes toward the EU among Russian citizens, with the intent of assessing the importance of political values and interests in shaping support for Russia's stated commitment to developing closer ties with Europe. It will thus clarify whether Putin's 'European choice' is likely to nurture doubts among the Russian population regarding those Russian policies criticized in European circles as contradicting European values.
The survey research was conducted at a time when the EU was in the news, just after the 2004 enlargement, which affected Russia's former allies and some of its closest neighbours. The survey sample covered three Russian regions, each with a different level of EU 'exposure'. 6 Nizhegorodskaia oblast, while relatively far from the European border, has, since the collapse of communism, nurtured significant European and EU contacts. A second region, Orlov oblast, lies in the heart of European Russia's more conservative (and formerly Red Belt) area, but is relatively close to Ukraine. Orlov oblast has less extensive, but developing, contacts with European institutions. In November 2003 the European Commission announced the opening of a regional support bureau of TACIS (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States) in Orel, the eighth of its kind, less than a year after
